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The Legality of Conditional Preferences to Developing
Countries under the GATT Enabling Clause
Jennifer L. Stamberger*
An issue that has plagued the GATT/WTO system since its inception has
been the question of how to handle the needs of both developed and developing
countries in one coherent system. As developing countries make up
approximately 75 percent of WTO membership,' this is a very real concern for
the future of the WTO. Accepting that developed countries have an obligation
to support developing countries as they seek to develop, WTO members, in
1979, enacted the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the "Enabling
Clause").2 The Enabling Clause suspends the GATT's general most favored
nation ("MFN") rule and allows developed country members to give differential
and more favorable treatment to developing countries. The mechanism for this
treatment is the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), under which
developed countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products
originating in developing countries. The GSP program is voluntary for
developed countries, who also determine which countries receive preferences
and to what extent those preferences are granted.
An ongoing question under the Enabling Clause has been the extent to
which developed countries may condition the granting of a preference on the
developing country's attainment of certain non-trade-related goals. For example,
developed countries have used this method of conditional preferences to tackle
labor, environmental, and now, drug-related issues. In January 2003, after
preliminary negotiations had broken down, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
granted a request from India for the Establishment of a Panel to address the
European Communities' ("EC") Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
AB 1999, Duke University; JD Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
I Peter Lichtenbaum, "Special Treatment" vs. 'Equal Particdation": Stika'ng a Balance in the Doha
Negotiations, 17 Am U Ind L Rev 1003, 1025 (2002).
2 World Trade Organization, Differential and More Favourable Treatment: Redprodty and Fuller
Particpation of Developing Countries, WTO Doc No L/4903 (Nov 28, 1979), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ enabling-e.pdf> (visited Sept 7, 2003)
(hereinafter Enabling Clause).
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
Preferences to Developing Countries.3 India argued that two aspects of the EC
scheme-conditions relating to drug production and trafficking and those
relating to labor rights and the environment-are inconsistent with GATT and
do not meet the requirements of the Enabling Clause. The Panel Decision in this
case will be vitally important in shaping the future of the WTO. If the measure is
allowed, the EC will be given a powerful tool for shaping the internal domestic
policies of nations at crucial stages in their development; if it is prohibited,
developing nations will be given a powerful freedom to achieve development on
their own terms.
This Development will trace a short history of the Enabling Clause and the
successes and failures associated with attempts to use the Clause to further other
goals. It will then analyze the arguments put forth by India and the EC regarding
the conditional preferences and will recommend that the Dispute Settlement
Panel find in favor of India and reject the conditioning of GSP provisions on
non-trade-related standards. Finally, this Development will address the possible
future of the Enabling Clause as a mechanism for establishing developing
country treatment of such goals as higher labor standards, environmental
protection, and prevention of drug trafficking.
I. THE ENABLING CLAUSE
The Enabling Clause was instituted by the WTO in 1979 to address the
role of developed countries in the economic progress of developing countries.
The Decision provides that "contracting parties may accord differential and
more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such
treatment to other contracting parties."4 The Clause allows developed member
nations to apply "[p]referential tariff treatment . . . to products originating in
developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of
Preferences."' This approach was designed to promote flexible commitments for
developing countries and to encourage developed countries to broaden market
access to those countries. The Uruguay Round Agreements and subsequent
World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European
Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc No
WT/DS246/4 (Dec 9, 2002), available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispu e/dispustatuse.htm> (visited Sept 7, 2003). The WTO granted India's request on
January 27, 2003. See World Trade Organization, Constitution of the Panel Established at
the Request of India, Note by the Secretariat, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries 1, WTO Doc No WT/DS246/5 (Mar 6, 2003),
available online at <http://www.wto.org/engish/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-statuse.htm>
(visited Sept 7, 2003).
4 Enabling Clause I (cited in note 2).
5 Enabling Clause 2(a) (cited in note 2).
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WTO Declarations include nearly 150 provisions concerning special and
differential treatment.
6
In practice, the Enabling Clause has proved to be a continuing source of
confusion among WTO Members Contrary to the GATT's general MFN
obligation, the Decision's language is thought not to require that once a
developed nation extends preferential tariff treatment to one developing nation,
it then extends such preferential treatment to all developing nations. Likewise,
the extension of preferential treatment is voluntary and may be revoked by the
developed country at any time.8 A more complicated question is whether
developed countries can condition the receipt of preferential tariff treatment on
a developing country's meeting certain non-trade goals.
II. To WHAT EXTENT CAN THE ENABLING CLAUSE BE USED
TO BROADEN THE WTO's AGENDA?
Developed countries argue that the Enabling Clause permits them to
condition the promise of additional preferential market access on the domestic
standards of the developing country. According to this conception, the GSP
system would allow a developed country to do something that it could not
legally do under the general GATT provisions. For example, in the labor
standards context, under the GATT/WTO system, a member nation could not
prohibit the importation of a certain good or goods from a nation with lower
labor standards, nor could the country apply heavier tariffs to such goods.9 Such
actions would violate GATT Articles XI and II, respectively, and would not be
cured by the exceptions in Article XX as they could be challenged as "disguised
restriction[s] on international trade."'" Proponents of conditional preferences
argue that the special nature of the preferential GSP scheme does allow for such
conditionality as would otherwise be prohibited by GATT.
6 Edith Brown Weiss, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Perspective, 96 Am Soc nd L
Proc 366, 367 (2002).
7 David R. Karasik, Student Note, Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East: Amending GAFF
Article XXIV to Allow Sectoral Preferences in Free Trade Areas, 18 Mich J Intl L 527, 560 (1997).
8 Diego J. Lifiin Nogueras and Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionaliy in the
External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimagy Problems, 7 Colum J Eur L 307, 331
(2001).
See, for example, Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales): Report Adopted by the
Contracting Parties on 7 November 1952 (G/32), 1 GATT BISD 60 (1953). In this early
case, the WTO Panel considered a Belgian policy under which a levy was applied on imports
purchased by governmental entities where the country of origination was determined to have
a less progressive system of family allowances than did Belgium. The Panel concluded that
the "social policy considerations" were "irrelevant" to their determination of whether the
levy violated the requirement that like products be treated equally.
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art XX, 1 GATT BISD 10 (1952), 55 UN Treaty
Set 262 (1950).
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The Enabling Clause has most commonly been used to link GSP
commitments to labor standards. For example, in 1998, the EC amended its
GSP to include "special incentive arrangements for the protection of certain
labor rights."'1 Developing countries that already receive preferential duties
applied to their exports to the EC may request more preferential rates only if
they agree to abide by the International Labor Organization Conventions
concerning the rights to organize and to bargain collectively and the minimum
age for employment. 2 Such developing countries must also submit to a rigorous
control procedure by the EC. Likewise, the US has enacted national legislation
to provide for the granting of duty-free benefits to developing countries,
contingent upon the satisfaction of certain criteria. For example, the Trade Act
of 1974 instructs the President to take into account "whether or not such
country has taken or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country ...
internationally recognized worker rights" when determining whether to name a
country a beneficiary developing country."
The GSP system allows granting countries enormous discretion in both the
scope and design of preferences. Because the extension of preferential treatment
is voluntary and entirely within the discretion of the donor country, such
commitments depend largely on political considerations. 14 Developing countries
have thus far refrained from challenging the GSP schemes either for lack of
consistency (similar countries receiving differing treatment) or for conditions
placed upon such treatment. It has been suggested that developing countries
refrain from posing such challenges because "they would rather be on good
terms with GSP donors."'" Developing countries that receive preferences want
to retain them, and developing countries that do not receive such preferences
are fearful of jeopardizing their chances of receiving them in the future.
The Dispute Settlement Body was nearly given the opportunity to consider
these issues in 2000, when Brazil requested consultations with the EC regarding
EC practices that Brazil claimed were inconsistent with the Enabling Clause. 6
However, Brazil did not follow up by requesting the establishment of a panel.
Commentators speculate that it was political pressure that caused this move on
11 Liftin Nogueras and Hinojosa Martinez, 7 Colum J Eur L at 322 (cited in note 8).
12 Id.
13 Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC § 2462(c)(7) (2000). For a more complete discussion of existing
American legislation that seeks to link international labor standards and US trade policy, see
James P. Kelleher, The Child Labor Deterrence Act. American Unilateralism and the GAT, 3 Minn
J Global Trade 161 (1994).
14 See Jose E. Alvarez, et al, It's a.Question of Market Access, 96 Am J Ind L 56, 71 (2002).
is Id.
16 See World Trade Organization, Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities-
Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WTO Doc No WT/DS209/1 (Oct 19, 2000), available online
at <http://www.wto.org/engflish/tratope/dispue/dispu-statuse.htm> (visited Sept 7,
2003).
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Brazil's part. 7 Therefore, the pending dispute between the EC and India will be
the Dispute Settlement Body's first opportunity to address these issues.
III. THE EC-INDIA DISPUTE
In June 2001, the European Commission adopted a new scheme of tariff
preferences for developing countries."8 Upon the adoption, Pascal Lamy, Trade
Commissioner for the European Union, called the scheme "the most generous
GSP package ever put forward by the European Union" and noted that the
scheme provided "further concrete evidence that the interests of developing
countries are at the top of [its] agenda."' 9 Under the package, the "special
incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and of the
environment become significantly more attractive."2 Under the EC GSP
currently in place, developing countries that qualify for "special incentive
arrangements" relating to protection of labor rights and the environment and to
the "drug regime" may be granted reduced tariff rates or have their tariff
obligations suspended.2
India is a beneficiary country under the EC's scheme of generalized tariff
preferences. Under the EC's GSP scheme for 2002-2004, several of India's tariff
preferences were removed. India is not included in the EC's special
arrangements to combat drug protection and trafficking, for the protection of
labor rights, or for the protection of the environment.
In December 2002, India requested the establishment of a Panel to
investigate the legality of the EC regime under the WTO.23 India is particularly
17 See Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 71 (cited in note 14).
18 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Coundl Regulation Appying a Scheme
of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period I Januagy 2002 to 31 December 2004, EC Doc No
COM(01)293 final, available online at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/externa-relations/
andean/doc/reg_293 01en.pdf> (visited Sept 7, 2003).
19 European Commission, Press Release, CoundlAdopts New Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) for
Developing Countries, IP/01/1763 at 1 (Dec 10, 2001), available online at
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh> (search for "IP/01/1763" in "Optional
search criteria: Reference" field) (visited Sept 7, 2003).
20 Id at 2.
21 See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation Appying a
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period 1 Januay 2002 to 31 December 2004 at 5-6
(cited in note 18).
22 Id at 32.
23 World Trade Organization, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences
to Developing Countries (cited in note 3). Other developing countries, including Colombia and
Venezuela, requested to participate in the initial consultations in light of their substantial
interests. See World Trade Organization, Request to Join Consultations, Communication
from Colombia, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WTO Doc No WT/DS246/3 (Apr 5, 2002), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/engish/tratop-e/ dispu_e/dispustatus_e.htm> (visited Sept 7,
2003); World Trade Organization, Request to Join Consultations, Communication from
Fall 2003
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concerned about two aspects of the EC's GSP scheme. First, the tariff
preferences accorded for combating drug production and trafficking are
available only to certain countries selected by the EC. Second, the preferences
available under the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labor
rights and the environment are accorded only to countries that meet labor and
environmental policy standards determined by the EC. India believes that the
tariff preferences granted under these special arrangements create undue
difficulties for India's exports and nullify or impair the benefits accruing to India
under the MFN provisions.24 India argued that preferential treatment is an
exception to a developed nation's MFN obligations only so far as it allows
discrimination in favor of developing countries.2" India further argued that the
exception was intended solely "to facilitate and promote the trade of developing
countries.""
The EC responded to India's allegation by claiming that the GSP scheme is
an "autonomous regime granted on a non-reciprocal, generalized and non-
discriminatory basis, in full conformity with the EC's GATT/WTO
commitments, including the Enabling Clause."27 The EC maintains that the
special incentives are designed to further internationally recognized objectives
and to promote sustainable development.2 8
As noted previously, this will be an issue of first impression for the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). Its resolution will carry significant
consequences as to the proper scope of the WTO as it seeks to rise to the
challenge posed by the integration of developing countries into the WTO
framework. This analysis will now turn to the legal arguments available to the
parties and to the policy considerations that the Panel will be required to take
into account. Finally, the analysis will seek to recommend an outcome of the
dispute and comment on its suitability.
Venezuela, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, WTO Doc No WT/DS246/2 (Mar 25, 2002), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/ dispustatus-e.htm> (visited Sept 7,
2003).
24 World Trade Organization, Request for Consultations by India, European Communities-
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc No
WT/DS246/1 (Mar 12, 2002), available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/dispustatus-e.htm> (visited Sept 7, 2003).
25 World Trade Organization, Panels Established, in WITO News: 2003 News Items, Dispute Settlement
Body 27 January 2003 at 2, available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
news03_e/dsb_27jan03_e.htm> (visited Sept 7, 2003).
26 Id.
27 Ld 3.
28 Id.
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A. ARGUMENTS AVAILABLE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
India's strongest argument may well come from the text of the Enabling
Clause itself. Importantly, the Clause states that "[a]ny differential and more
favourable treatment ... shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of
developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for
the trade of any other contracting parties" and "shall . . .respond positively to
the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries."29 GSP
preferential arrangements should, therefore, aim to facilitate trade, should not
create obstacles to the trade of third countries, and should not impede MFN-
based liberalization. The Enabling Clause also states that the measures enacted
under the auspices of the GSP "should promote the basic objectives of
[GATT]."3 ° These requirements suggest that all preferences granted under the
Clause must be directly related to beneficial trade consequences.
These provisions underscore the general concern for the promotion of
developing countries that is evident within the WTO system. The GSP is
intended to compensate for the relative disadvantages of developing countries in
the competitive global marketplace and "to facilitate their industrialzation
[sic]."3I For decades, the WTO has made clear that one of the Contracting
Parties' primary goals is the increased inclusion of less-developed countries in
world markets and improved market access.32 Indeed, GATT Part IV specifically
tackles the particular challenges that developing countries face.33
The importance of this general theme is pivotal for India because it
underscores the fact that the purpose of the GSP is to aid developing countries
and suggests that conditions that are unrelated to that goal, or worse yet that are
contrary to it, should not be permitted. For example, developing nations
included in the EC's special arrangements for the protection of the environment
may be granted a preference conditioned on that nation's attainment of certain
environmental standards (potentially unrelated to trade arrangements). Although
the GSP is fundamentally voluntary on the part of developed nations, India
could reasonably argue that the stated purpose of the Enabling Clause is to aid
developing countries and that goal should not be eclipsed by other unstated
goals, such as environmental protection.
It is also beneficial for India that DSB Panel decisions demonstrate a
general reluctance to impose one country's standards upon another. Two general
29 Enabling Clause 3, 3(a), (c) (cited in note 2).
30 Id 7.
31 Karasik, 18 Mich J Intl L at 559 n174 (cited in note 7).
32 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards andAccountabifit for the Use of the WTO Secur4y Exception:
Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establising a New Balance between Sovereignty and
Multilateralism, 26 Yale J Intl L 413, 443 (2001).
33 Id.
Fall 2003
Stakberger
Chicago Journal of International Law
principles established by the Tuna-Doohin Panel are significant here.34 First,
where there is no direct impact on the importing nation, the exporting nation is
given sole discretion over its production processes. Second, trade restrictions
governing production process decisions are best enacted through multilateral
agreements. These underlying principles suggest that the imposition of such
standards has no place in the WTO system, at least not in its current form.
As noted previously, in its Request for the Establishment of a Panel, India
expressed concern that the EC GSP system affords preferences only to certain
developing nations chosen by the EC. Although the text of the Enabling Clause
does not make it particularly clear whether such discrimination between
developing countries is allowed,35 as noted previously, the language is generally
thought not to require that preferential treatment be extended to all developing
countries once it is extended to one. Therefore, it seems likely that India may
lose on this point. India may be wise to focus instead on the issues raised in the
previous paragraphs in this Part. That is not to say, however, that the argument
could not be shaped so as to afford India the protection from unequal treatment
it is ultimately seeking.
B. ARGUMENTS AVAILABLE TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The European Community may be most successful by focusing its
argument on the inherently different nature of the GSP system as compared to
the general provisions of trade law under GATT. The GSP allows the general
GATT rules to be suspended in favor of developing countries so as to
encourage their progress. It is arguable that by suspending the prohibition on
tariff rates conditional on exporting country conditions, the GSP could go even
further toward aiding developing countries in achieving development.
For example, the EC could argue that although the GSP bias in favor of
developing countries would not be sustainable under GATT (for the reasons
stated previously), the GSP is a special system designed to alleviate the otherwise
heavy burden on developing countries. It is undisputed that the general financial
aid given by one country to another may be conditioned upon whatever
requirements the donor country sees fit. It would follow, therefore, that because
the preferential system is a voluntary one granted by developed countries at their
discretion, the granting of the preferences carries with it the ability to qualify the
preference as the developed country sees fit.
34 GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc No
DS2I/1 (Sept 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1619 (1991). Consider Kelleher, 3 Minn J
Global Trade at 180 (cited in note 13).
35 See Enabling Clause I (cited in note 2) ("[C]ontracting parties may accord differential and
more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other
contractingparies.") (emphasis added).
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The question of whether drug trafficking and environmental protection
provisions may be made conditions of a developing country's receiving
preferential tariff rates has not been addressed in either the courts or (to a
significant extent) in the literature. However, conditioning treatment on labor
standards is both fairly common among developed countries and fairly well
analyzed in the literature. "The imposition of a labor condition appears not to
offend GATT obligations since a waiver of the basic MFN obligation enables
the operation of the Generalized System of Preferences."36 The EC would,
therefore, do well to contend that the other two conditions imposed by the EC
regulation-drug prevention and environmental protection-are the functional
equivalents of labor standards and should thus be treated similarly. This
argument is plausible because in a broad sense each of these standards furthers a
common goal. The developed country imposing the standard is basically saying,
''you are allowing something that we do not approve of (environmental
degradation, trafficking in illegal drugs, child labor, or unsafe labor conditions)
and as a result we believe that our country is being harmed (either directly or in
some larger sense). Therefore, we will give you preferential trade treatment but
only on the condition that you stop allowing these negative things." In such a
broad sense, these conditions do seem sufficiently similar.
The EC should note, however, at least two significant counterarguments to
that classification. First, a strong argument could be made that labor standards
and drug trafficking/environmental protection are not similar enough to justify
the connection. Labor standards are much more closely tied to trade in goods
than are drug trafficking provisions, and to a lesser extent, environmental
protection. Perhaps if one concludes that GSP schemes are not the proper
mechanism through which to tackle labor standards, then one would conclude
even more vehemently that drug trafficking is certainly not properly addressed in
that context, as the connection between drugs and trade in other goods is even
more tenuous. Second, although many commentators believe that imposing
labor conditions under the GSP does not violate GATT, that is certainly not a
foregone conclusion and there is reasonable disagreement on that point. Further,
even if plausible under GATT, there is contention over whether imposing
conditional preferences is the right way to encourage development. The US
legislation has attracted particular attention. The establishment of an
internationally imposed labor standard by the US "has been decried by some as
aggressive unilateralism and welcomed by others as a fitting way to link
economic and social progress."37
36 Janelle M. Diller and David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization
of Intemational Law, 91 AmJ Ind L 663, 690 (1997).
37 Id.
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In general, the EC should push for a slightly broader conception of the
purpose of the WTO. Surely the WTO exists to promote fair trade, but at least
in the context of the GSP, it also exists to promote growth and sustainable
development in developing countries. One of the ways that it does so is through
financial support Sy developed countries and the encouragement of improved
standards of living, which arguably is what the EC is trying to accomplish here.
C. RESOLUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Both India and the EC have strong arguments in their favor, and the
governing treaty provisions and WTO decisions are vague enough to allow the
Panel to decide in either party's favor. However, I believe that the Panel should
resolve this dispute in favor of India and the developing nations. Such a decision
is necessary to maintain the character of the GSP as a structure to foster the
incorporation of developing countries into the global economy.
Allowing conditional preferences would mean that developed countries
could structure the GSP imposed on developing countries according to their
own desires and political ambitions. The granting of such preferences is clearly
in conflict with the goals of the Enabling Clause to promote trade of developing
countries without raising barriers or creating undue difficulties. Allowing
freedom in structuring preferences in this way could impose conditions on
developing nations that far outweigh the benefits that they would receive from
the preferential tariff. Such a system runs the danger of becoming a means for
developed nations not only to impose their values on other countries but also to
restrict those nations from developing at all. For example, the EC's rigorous
control and monitoring procedure alone could make participation in the GSP
system prohibitively difficult for many countries. Such procedures defeat the
purpose of the preferential system.
Allowing such conditional preferences would open the door for those who
believe that developed countries should be permitted to condition their GSP
schemes to call for additional and even less appropriate conditions. For example,
some commentators argue that "curbing transnational bribery should become a
WTO goal."38 If the Panel were to decide in favor of the EC, it could be argued
that the decision serves as precedent for a scheme that conditions the granting
of preferences on the nation's having in place measures to combat transnational
bribery. Such a decision could mean that any interest group with a modicum of
political clout could persuade developed nations to condition trade preferences
on developing countries' advancements towards their specific goal. There are an
infinite number of challenges facing the global community. Developing
countries already argue that standards imposed by developed nations are too
38 See Jose E. Alvarez and Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Oqganization, 96 Am J
Ind L 28, 33 (2002).
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imposing, and thus, prevent them from actively participating in the global
marketplace. Allowing additional conditional preferences causes a significant risk
of ensuring that developing countries will never be permitted to become active
partners in the international economy.
Finally, as noted previously, few would disagree with the contention that
financial aid granted by one country to another may be conditioned upon
whatever requirements the donor country sees fit. However, the tariff
preferences system is not properly considered aid in the same sense. As such
preferences are part of a larger trade network, there is not necessarily room for
developed countries to impose their national standards on less-developed
countries as a condition for their receipt of those preferences. Should the Panel
allow such conditional preferences, the character of the WTO would change
definitively and significantly. While certainly possible, such a transformation is
properly accomplished not unilaterally, but through a comprehensive new WTO
agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision will come down to a fundamental choice about the mission of
the WTO in the next century-is the WTO to be a regulating body ensuring fair
trade between diverse nations, or a global organization with a broad agenda,
including labor, environmental, and drug trafficking goals? Jose Alvarez and
Steve Charnovitz argue that "one of the biggest challenges" currently facing the
WTO is "to determine its own mission., 39 There is ongoing dispute over the
extent to which the WTO framework should be expanded to include room for
other issues of international concern, particularly higher labor standards and
environmental protection. The debate is active even within the leadership of the
WTO. In early 2001, former Directors General of the GATT or the WTO,
Arthur Dunkel, Peter D. Sutherland, and Renato Ruggiero, circulated a public
statement expressing their opinion that "[t]he WTO [should not] be used as a
Christmas tree on which to hang any and every good cause that might be
secured by exercising trade power., 40 However, later that year, acting WTO
Director-General Mike Moore responded that governments "urgently need to
broaden the agenda beyond the mandated negotiations" included in the WTO
agreements.41 In the upcoming Dispute Settlement, the Panel has the
opportunity to alter the character of the WTO. However, such a transformation
would be inappropriately positioned there. If developed countries are concerned
about labor standards, environmental protection, or drug trafficking, there are
39 Id at 28.
40 id.
41 Id.
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other avenues open to them in which the propagation of international standards
should be sought.
Vol. 4 No. 2
